Poor Canadian Ship Welds:
A
report from Ed Craig:
During the nineteen
nineties, I was invited to provide a weld evaluation for an East Coast
Canadian Ship Yard that was building Frigates for the Canadian Navy. At the ship
yard I was astounded to find that welding was beyond chaos, it was Disney Land
upside down. The weld engineers had established poor weld practices and did not
appear to understand the fundamental weld process utilized. The majority of welders
in the yard were out of control and the management did not seem to have a clue
about the daily weld chaos in the yard.
IN
THE ONE WELD SETTING SHIP YARD. To make fillet welds, cold short circuit welds
were applied first and low parameter flux cored welds were made over the top of
the short circuit welds. It
was difficult for me to believe that the penetrating MIG spray transfer process
was not allowed for the common steel welds, while the cold MIG short circuit process
was used frequently on the welds.
Of
course the second fact I discovered was that few in the yard knew what short circuit
and spray transfer was, and even fewer understood the working weld parameter range
of the E71T-1 flux cored wires.
To
produce the common, 1/4 - 6 mm, steel fillet welds on the Canadian Navy frigates,
the 200 plus ship yard welders would first use the MIG "short circuit transfer"
on the flat / horizontal welds on steel parts that ranged from 3 to 25 mm thick.
The short circuit weld transfer settings used would normally be used to weld 14
to 10 gauge sheet metals.
When I questioned the ship yard's weld engineers
why the welders were using the low current MIG Short Circuit mode, I simply got
that confused weld look. The short circuit parameters were used with an 0.045
(1.2mm) wire, set at a wire feed rate of 200 to 350 ipm, 180
to 230 amps and 22 to 23 volts. Without question these welds would result
in extensive lack of weld fusion, on all carbon steel parts > 4 mm.
It
was interesting to note in a yard with many "welding experts" that the
welders believed they could make all the MIG and flux cored welds with one wire
feed setting. The MIG short circuit wire feed settings were
200 to 350 ipm. (10 to 3 o'clock). To add to the weld problems at the yard, the
short circuit welds were then followed by a second cold weld pass made with an
0.045 1.2 mm, gas shielded "all position" E71T-1 flux cored wire with
the same wire feed settings. The fast freeze weld wire settings were ideally suited
for slow moving vertical up welds.
ITS A SIMPLE FACT THAT the MIG and
flux cored wire feed settings used in this yard were poorly suited to attain optimum
weld fusion on most steel welds > 4 mm, made in the flat / horizontal weld
positions. The results were and still are, extensive lack
of weld fusion, extensive weld slag and extensive weld porosity on the majority
of the frigates parts > 4 mm.
THE
CANADIAN SHIP YARD WORKERS WERE ALLOWED BY THE HANDS OFF ENGINEERS AND MANAGERS
TO USE A COMMON LOW SINGLE WIRE FEED SETTING THAT WHEN NDT WAS APPLIED WOULD HAVE
REVEALED EXTENSIVE WELD DEFECTS. WHY SHOULD THE NAVY BE CONCERNED? NDT IS APPLIED
TO THE MINORITY OF A SHIPS WELDS.
To
put salt in the welding wounds, every weld produced took over 60% longer than
it should have, which likely was not an issue for the ship yard management as
the Canadian tax payers paid the welding bills.
This
yard spent over a million dollars annually on welder training, again a ridiculous
waste of tax payers money as it was certainly not effective MIG or flux cored
training.
My
report determined that if the correct weld settings had been used, an annual weld
cost savings for the ship yard would have been over 3 million dollars. 
My report on both the weld quality and cost reduction potential never got far
as the first manager who reviewed it. My guess was the manager was too embarrassed
to present it to his executive team, or possibly the manager did not want the
navy to be aware of the weld quality of it's ships.
As
the following data shows, poor work man ship may do more damage to Canada's and
the US navy vessels than weapons of mass destruction.
US
Navy Subs To Undergo Checks For Bad Welds
All
non-nuclear piping systems on Virginia-class submarines are potentially affected
by a welding problem first discovered on the New Hampshire, still under construction
at Electric Boat in Groton.
The
Navy said it is too early to estimate the cost or describe plans to fully correct
the welds on the Virginia-class submarines. The problem is being blamed on “process
weaknesses”
at Northrop Grumman Newport News in Virginia, and
was discovered after two failures occurred during routine testing of the welds
in August and October.
(From ed. Note,
it's not the management or Navy brass that's at fault, it's a weakness with the
process)
Electric
Boat (EB) first found the flawed welds while testing two small-diameter piping-system
joints on the New Hampshire. EB and Newport News share the construction workload
for Virginia-class submarines under a teaming agreement. Together, they produce
one $2.5 billion submarine a year.
“Until
the analysis of the long-term corrective action is complete, the scope of inspection
and rework will not be known,” said Katie Dunnigan, a Navy spokesman.
USS
Nimitz
USS
Nimitz, only one weld out of the approximately 100 tested,passed.
U.S.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TRANSMITS REPORT SUBSTANTIATING WHISTLEBLOWER’S
ALLEGATIONS OF DEFECTIVE WELDING ON U.S. AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS’ LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE - 3/13/03
CONTACT: JANE MCFARLAND
(202) 653-7984
The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) today transmitted to President Bush and
the Congress, an investigative report substantiating a whistleblower’s allegations
that unqualified welders, at the Naval Air Depot in North Island, California,
had improperly performed “critical” welds on the catapult hydraulic
piping systems of four U.S. aircraft carriers. These hydraulic systems are used
to power various control devices and motors related to aircraft carriers’
launch and recovery systems. Nonconforming welds were found on the USS Abraham
Lincoln and the USS Constellation, currently stationed in the Persian Gulf;
the USS Nimitz, currently headed to the Gulf; and the USS John C. Stennis. Weld
failures, although unlikely, could have resulted in the loss of aircraft and in
injuries during launch procedures. The investigation also found that the jet blast
deflector cylinder vent piping onboard a fifth aircraft carrier, the USS Carl
Vinson, had also been improperly welded.
The whistleblower, Kristin Shott,
a welder with over twelve years of experience, alleged to OSC that North Island
Depot Voyage Repair Team (VRT) welders were not qualified for the work that they
performed. Compounding the problem, she alleged that the Depot’s inspectors,
tasked with inspecting the welders’ work, were also unqualified. Special
Counsel Elaine Kaplan concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that the
information Ms. Shott had provided disclosed a substantial and specific danger
to public safety, as well as violations of military welding standards. By law,
when such a substantial likelihood determination is made with respect to a whistleblower’s
disclosures, the agency involved, in this case the Department of the Navy, is
required to conduct an investigation of the disclosures and report its findings
and any planned corrective and/or disciplinary actions to the Special Counsel.
The Special Counsel transmitted Ms. Shott’s disclosures to former
Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable Gordon R. England. The Office of the Naval
Inspector General (OIG) investigated the allegations for the Secretary. In reporting
back to OSC, former Navy Secretary England concluded the investigation “exposed
serious shortcomings in the quality assurance program at the Naval Air Depot.”
Specifically, the investigation found that the North Island VRT welders performed
critical shipboard welding processes on Navy ships that they were not qualified
to perform, the weld inspectors who performed the “nondestructive testing”
inspections of the welds were not properly certified, and the VRT lacked a viable
quality assurance program. The former Navy Secretary noted that “Carrier
Battle Ships are our frontline of national defense” and that “[t]he
events described in the report of investigation establish how easy it would be
to render these assets ineffective.”
In February 2002, upon
learning of the preliminary results of the investigation, senior management at
the North Island Navy Air Depot immediately suspended all shipboard welding operations
and testing inspections at the base, pending the training and qualification of
welders and inspectors. Shortly thereafter, North Island Depot welders and inspectors
were sent to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) for Naval Sea System Command
qualification and recertification training. In addition, teams from PSNS inspected
welds performed by VRT welders in order to discover and repair critical nonconforming
welds. On the USS Abraham Lincoln, the PSNS team found that
only 2 out of approximately 100 welds passed their inspection; on the
USS Nimitz, only one weld out of approximately 100 passed. The
team also found the VRT welders had performed nonconforming welds on the USS Constellation
and USS John C. Stennis’ catapult hydraulic systems and on the USS Carl Vinson’s
the jet blast deflector cylinder vent piping. The agency report explains that
most of the nonconforming welds failed inspection because they were undersized.
Repairs to the catapult hydraulic piping systems on the USS Lincoln were
completed in April 2002; on the USS Nimitz, in May 2002; on the USS Constellation,
in June 2002; and on the USS Stennis, in November 2002. Repairs on the jet blast
deflector cylinder vent piping onboard the USS Vinson were completed in December
2002. The agency reports that $468,000 was spent on repairs for three of the
aircraft carriers. The report did not include the repair costs for two of
the carriers – the USS Stennis and USS Vinson.
To ensure that future
compliance with Naval Air Sea System Command quality and certification requirements
is permanently sustained, the agency report states that the Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Carderock Division (Carderock), intends to conduct an initial welding
and testing audit of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) organizations, to be followed
by an audit every two years thereafter. The agency informed OSC that Carderock
intends to conduct welding and testing audits at three East Coast Naval Stations
during the final week of March. However, audits have not yet been scheduled for
NAVAIR’s West Coast locations, including the North Island Depot, nor has
funding been received at this point by Carderock to allow these audits to take
place.
The agency report concluded that four supervisors and one Naval
Officer had performed their duties in a negligent manner. It found that the North
Island VRT first-line supervisor was aware that the VRT employees were not properly
certified, yet he failed to aggressively pursue this issue through his chain of
command and continued to assign VRT welders work that he knew they were unqualified
to perform. As a result, he was suspended for three days. A Non-Punitive
Letter of Caution was issued to the Naval Officer who oversaw the quality assurance
program. Two civilian VRT supervisors and one civilian quality assurance supervisor
were counseled and orally admonished.
In transmitting the agency report
to the President and the Congress, the Special Counsel is required by statute
to evaluate whether it contains the necessary information and whether its findings
appear reasonable. Special Counsel Elaine Kaplan found that, in most respects,
the Department of the Navy report met these requirements. However, she found that
the disciplinary action taken against responsible officials did not appear adequate
in light of the gravity of their misconduct, and she expressed concern that the
agency has not yet scheduled welding and NDT inspection audits for West Coast
NAVAIR locations, noting that these audits are critical to the extent that they
may allow the Navy to discover and repair other noncompliant welds on Navy vessels,
that may otherwise pose a danger to public safety.
Among its other functions,
the Office of Special Counsel provides federal employees with a secure channel
for blowing the whistle on violations of law, rule or regulation, gross mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health and safety. OSC requires agencies to conduct investigations whenever
it finds a substantial likelihood that a federal employee’s disclosures demonstrate
the existence of one of these conditions. The agency must then report its findings
as well as any corrective action taken to OSC. After OSC reviews the report to
ensure that it contains the necessary information and that its findings appear
reasonable, OSC transmits the report to the President and the Congress for further
action, if appropriate.
Copies of the report from the Department of the
Navy can be obtained by contacting OSC. The closure letter to the President is
available at OSC’s website under E-Library.
US News follow up:
The life of a whistle-blower isn't easy, however. Shott, 38, a Navy welder
based at the North Island Naval Air Depot in San Diego, has also filed a reprisal
complaint against the Navy. She was demoted and denied a supervisory promotion,
she says, after filing her initial complaints in 1999. "My career has been
destroyed," she says. "I am no longer doing critical welds." The
Navy insists that it did not punish her, but the Office of Special Counsel doesn't
agree. "Because of her whistle-blowing," it said last month in a letter
to her attorney, Navy officials "improperly" removed her from an elite
repair team and denied her a promotion.
Poor
Ericka:
Bad
Welds likely sent you to the ocean floor:
March
29.07
Ed Craig:
HAVE
WE LEARNT NOTHING ABOUT SHIP WELDING IN THE LAST SIX DECADES?
As
metallurgists the world over typically look to the ship's design, steel compositions,
cold water and rust for the causes of too many catastrophic ship failures, few
of these individuals seem to take into account that on any global built ship you
will find more bad welds then good welds.
On
every merchant and naval vessel, extensive lack of weld
fusion, slag inclusions and porosity are the norm. With this in mind, any
reasonable person with weld process knowledge and limited metallurgical expertise
would surmise that in an event of a severe storm and excess ship deformation,
that bad flux cored welds and weld edge preparations that have nothing to do with
the design weld specifications, will be the weakest link
on a ship. For those looking for security from the double hull construction
of the next decade, keep in mind that unless ship yards change their approach
to welding, the double hull ships simply double the amount of bad welds.
In
the 1940's bad SMAW (stick) welds, weld consumable issues, suspect steels and
poor weld practices were responsible for numerous Liberty ship failures. Sixty
years later we have achieved what? We have a superior flux cored process, yet
due to poor weld management and engineering process ignorance, the amount or type
of weld defects in ship construction has hardly changed in sixty years.
|
SHIP
DESIGN IS IRRELEVANT
WITHOUT SOUND WELDS:
2006:
Each year over 400 ships sink, many as a result of weakened
structures from
corrosion but how many as
a result of bad welds?
MANY SHIPS GET TORN
APART LIKE A WET PAPER
BAG.
Six
Sigma comes to ship yards and large weld shops
even
after it failed many robot welding applications
in the automotive / truck
industries.
NO ONE USES MORE WELD CONSUMABLES THAN A SHIP YARD.
NO ONE LEAVES
MORE DEFECTS IN THE WELDS THAN A SHIP YARD.
Ed
Craig. 03/2007:
Ship
yards may use half to over a million pounds of flux cored weld wire each year,
however not one a single global ship yard has established Best Weld Practices
or implemented effective Flux Cored Weld Process Control Training for it's play
around with the weld controls work force.
Are ship yard managers and supervisors aware of the following?
For
decades the global shipyard focus has been on the welders "stick welding
skills".The majority of global ship yard welders that weld with the flux
cored process will lack flux cored weld process control expertise and use the
unsuitable techniques and skills they learnt with the lower weld energy, lower
weld deposition stick process.
The flux cored process and welding ceramic
backed steels requires unique considerations and specific instructions for all
position, root, fill and cap weld passes. The data and instructions required are
rarely found in the ship yard weld procedures. It's a sad comment in a time when
weld defects inundate ship yards that that many global ship yard apprentices will
in 2007 spend more time practicing with stick electrodes than they will with flux
cored consumables. It's also a weld reality that the welding instructors who teach
the ship yard apprentices flux cored welding are likely to get these young people
into bad stick welding habits.
Visit
Ed's Unique, Flux Cored Weld
Process Control Training Resources
New
Navy ship only 400 million over budget
NORFOLK
- The new amphibious ship San Antonio failed to complete a series of sea trials
in late March, and faces
$36 million in repairs during
the next three months.
The
San Antonio has been plagued by mechanical and structural problems since the Navy
took ownership two years late, in July 2005. Northrup Grumman Ship Systems in
Pascagoula, Miss., built the ship at a cost of $1.2 billion,
roughly $400 million over budget.
USS
Nimitz
USS
Nimitz, only one weld out of approximately 100 passed.
U.S.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TRANSMITS REPORT SUBSTANTIATING WHISTLEBLOWER’S
ALLEGATIONS OF DEFECTIVE WELDING ON U.S. AIRCRAFT
CARRIERS’ LAUNCH AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE - 3/13/03
CONTACT: JANE MCFARLAND
(202) 653-7984
The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) today transmitted to President Bush and
the Congress, an investigative report substantiating a whistleblower’s allegations
that unqualified welders, at the Naval Air Depot in North Island, California,
had improperly performed “critical” welds on the catapult hydraulic
piping systems of four U.S. aircraft carriers. These hydraulic systems are used
to power various control devices and motors related to aircraft carriers’
launch and recovery systems. Nonconforming welds were found on the USS Abraham
Lincoln and the USS Constellation, currently stationed in the Persian Gulf;
the USS Nimitz, currently headed to the Gulf; and the USS John C. Stennis. Weld
failures, although unlikely, could have resulted in the loss of aircraft and in
injuries during launch procedures. The investigation also found that the jet blast
deflector cylinder vent piping onboard a fifth aircraft carrier, the USS Carl
Vinson, had also been improperly welded.
The whistleblower, Kristin Shott,
a welder with over twelve years of experience, alleged to OSC that North Island
Depot Voyage Repair Team (VRT) welders were not qualified for the work that they
performed. Compounding the problem, she alleged that the Depot’s inspectors,
tasked with inspecting the welders’ work, were also unqualified. Special
Counsel Elaine Kaplan concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that the
information Ms. Shott had provided disclosed a substantial and specific danger
to public safety, as well as violations of military welding standards. By law,
when such a substantial likelihood determination is made with respect to a whistleblower’s
disclosures, the agency involved, in this case the Department of the Navy, is
required to conduct an investigation of the disclosures and report its findings
and any planned corrective and/or disciplinary actions to the Special Counsel.
The Special Counsel transmitted Ms. Shott’s disclosures to former
Secretary of the Navy, The Honorable Gordon R. England. The Office of the Naval
Inspector General (OIG) investigated the allegations for the Secretary. In reporting
back to OSC, former Navy Secretary England concluded the investigation “exposed
serious shortcomings in the quality assurance program at the Naval Air Depot.”
Specifically, the investigation found that the North Island VRT welders performed
critical shipboard welding processes on Navy ships that they were not qualified
to perform, the weld inspectors who performed the “nondestructive testing”
inspections of the welds were not properly certified, and the VRT lacked a viable
quality assurance program. The former Navy Secretary noted that “Carrier
Battle Ships are our frontline of national defense” and that “[t]he
events described in the report of investigation establish how easy it would be
to render these assets ineffective.”
In February 2002, upon learning
of the preliminary results of the investigation, senior management at the North
Island Navy Air Depot immediately suspended all shipboard welding operations and
testing inspections at the base, pending the training and qualification of welders
and inspectors. Shortly thereafter, North Island Depot welders and inspectors
were sent to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) for Naval Sea System Command
qualification and recertification training. In addition, teams from PSNS inspected
welds performed by VRT welders in order to discover and repair critical nonconforming
welds. On the USS Abraham Lincoln, the PSNS team found that only 2 out of approximately
100 welds passed their inspection; on the USS Nimitz, only one weld out
of approximately 100 passed. The team also found the VRT welders had performed
nonconforming welds on the USS Constellation and USS John C. Stennis’ catapult
hydraulic systems and on the USS Carl Vinson’s the jet blast deflector cylinder
vent piping. The agency report explains that most of the nonconforming welds failed
inspection because they were undersized.
Repairs to the catapult hydraulic
piping systems on the USS Lincoln were completed in April 2002; on the USS Nimitz,
in May 2002; on the USS Constellation, in June 2002; and on the USS Stennis, in
November 2002. Repairs on the jet blast deflector cylinder vent piping onboard
the USS Vinson were completed in December 2002. The agency reports that $468,000
was spent on repairs for three of the aircraft carriers. The report did not
include the repair costs for two of the carriers – the USS Stennis and USS
Vinson.
To ensure that future compliance with Naval Air Sea System Command
quality and certification requirements is permanently sustained, the agency report
states that the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (Carderock),
intends to conduct an initial welding and testing audit of Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) organizations, to be followed by an audit every two years thereafter.
The agency informed OSC that Carderock intends to conduct welding and testing
audits at three East Coast Naval Stations during the final week of March. However,
audits have not yet been scheduled for NAVAIR’s West Coast locations, including
the North Island Depot, nor has funding been received at this point by Carderock
to allow these audits to take place.
The agency report concluded that four
supervisors and one Naval Officer had performed their duties in a negligent manner.
It found that the North Island VRT first-line supervisor was aware that the VRT
employees were not properly certified, yet he failed to aggressively pursue this
issue through his chain of command and continued to assign VRT welders work that
he knew they were unqualified to perform. As a result, he was suspended for
three days. A Non-Punitive Letter of Caution was issued to the Naval Officer
who oversaw the quality assurance program. Two civilian VRT supervisors and one
civilian quality assurance supervisor were counseled and orally admonished.
In transmitting the agency report to the President and the Congress, the Special
Counsel is required by statute to evaluate whether it contains the necessary information
and whether its findings appear reasonable. Special Counsel Elaine Kaplan found
that, in most respects, the Department of the Navy report met these requirements.
However, she found that the disciplinary action taken against responsible officials
did not appear adequate in light of the gravity of their misconduct, and she expressed
concern that the agency has not yet scheduled welding and NDT inspection audits
for West Coast NAVAIR locations, noting that these audits are critical to the
extent that they may allow the Navy to discover and repair other noncompliant
welds on Navy vessels, that may otherwise pose a danger to public safety.
Among its other functions, the Office of Special Counsel provides federal employees
with a secure channel for blowing the whistle on violations of law, rule or regulation,
gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health and safety. OSC requires agencies to conduct
investigations whenever it finds a substantial likelihood that a federal employee’s
disclosures demonstrate the existence of one of these conditions. The agency must
then report its findings as well as any corrective action taken to OSC. After
OSC reviews the report to ensure that it contains the necessary information and
that its findings appear reasonable, OSC transmits the report to the President
and the Congress for further action, if appropriate.
Copies of the report
from the Department of the Navy can be obtained by contacting OSC. The closure
letter to the President is available at OSC’s website under E-Library.
<1960:
5000 liberty ships built,
Thanks
to engineers, 1000 catastrophic failures.
Premature
weld failure during a ship's voyage or even during the ship's christening as the
ship free floats from the USA, Asian or European dock, will typically be influenced
by the energy absorbed in the ship's structure during the excess stresses. Excess
deformation for a ship can occur during a storm, in a collision at sea or during
grounding. Thanks to the too common, global, lack of "weld process management
/ engineering ownership," every merchant
or naval vessel built
since the late 1980's with the MIG and flux cored process will have extensive,
unnecessary weld defects which can ultimately result in unanticipated catastrophic
consequences.
03/2007:
Its ironic that in 2007, the integrity of a "single hull" ship will
often have little to do with ship's design or the forces of nature, however the
failure of the ship may have a great deal to do with the ship's
weld integrity.
The common weld processes utilized in ship building
are the flux cored and MIG processes. These two weld processes account for approx.
90% of the global daily welds produced in all welding companies. The MIG and flux
cored processes have been around for decades and are perfectly able to produce
optimum, all position quality welds on ay steel applications.
In most
global ship yards during the year 2007, engineers and welders will daily "play
around" with the weld controls and these weld professionals will typically
be unaware of the weld process control requirements that could be implemented
for the variables that daily impact their weld quality and productivity.
While
some ivory tower ship yard managers and head in the clouds Navy officers look
to lasers and robots for future ship yard welds, few of these personnel understand
that for six decades, the ship yards that build their vessels have been unable
to control the majority of the manual welds on the ships. For those ship yard
managers and engineers that are rearing up in defensive exasperation of these
claims, please remember your over budget annual extra NDT costs, your extensive
historical daily weld rework costs, your too common production comes first before
quality approach, and lets not forget your hand's off management / engineering
approach to the MIG and flux cored process.
Of course I should not bring
the point up but in the cost conscious ship building business, I can guarantee
you that only one out of ten weld decision makers in a ship yard will have the
ability to quickly work out the simple costs of a MIG or flux cored fillet weld.
In
the good old SMAW (stick weld) days, steel ships broke apart due to weld induced
low hydrogen cracking, steels with excess impurities, design ignorance and a too
common apathetic management / engineering approach to ship building welding quality.
Since the 1980's the majority of ships have been built from high quality,
low carbon steels and welded with low hydrogen flux cored consumables. You would
have thought these two important attributes would have resolved the catastrophic
ship failure issues.
Lets face it welds on low carbon steels are typically
supposed to surpass the strength and ductility of the base
steels.
In
2007 welds are not supposed to fail, yet many ships "unaffected by rust"
have plate that stays intact while the welds tear apart like a wet paper bag.
03/
2007: Is it possible that the global ship building flux cored, lack
of weld best practices and process controls are partially responsible for
many of the catastrophic failures that sink approx. 400 ships each year?
[a]
It is a weld reality that the majority of vee groove welds made on global ships
will be made on questionable weld joints and excess root gaps that would not be
allowed in any other industry.
[b]
It's a weld reality that the QA departments
in many global ship yards will place minimal focus on the quality standards that
should be applied to the weld edge preparations.
[c]
It's a weld reality that unacceptable, over sized weld gaps and poor weld
buttering practices add to the scope of the potential defects and also apply excess
heat to
the weld's HAZ.
[d]
It's a weld reality that every day critical welds will be made on ship welds and
these welds will be made on contaminated, wet and cold surfaces.
[e]
It's a weld reality that due to process ignorance and apathetic ship building
management, the majority of the ships welds produced daily will have extensive
lack of weld fusion, slag inclusions and excess weld porosity.
[f]
Its a weld reality that most ship yards when making the transition from STICK
to FCAW, forgot to provide the appropriate flux cored weld process control training.
[f]
It's a weld reality that only partial NDT is applied to the vee groove welds and
often the NDT that is applied is too forgiving.
[g]
It's a weld reality Weld Quality Standards have a different meaning in each country
that builds ships.
With
all the money Ed makes from welding, his dream,
" to one day own a "house
boat".
The excessive weld defects that can be found in any global ship yard, or for that
matter in any large weld manufacturing facility that produces all position flux
cored welds, will have little to do with the welders.
The too common global lack of process control expertise, and general lack of understanding
for weld costs and productivity potential has everything to do with global managers,
engineers and supervisors who;
[1]
lack the knowledge and sometimes the interest to control their manufacturing tolerances,
[2]
lack the process ability to recognize the shop floor root causes of weld issues
that influence weld integrity and the daily weld issues,
[3]
fail to recognize the consequences of their lack of process ownership.
I
wonder how long many ship yard managers, supervisors and engineers would last
in their organization, if every weld produced was given a UT examination?
For
those mangers who believe they have effective process control training programs
in place, look back at your manual weld rework, rejects and extra NDT costs for
2006. If you use robots, look at the national average robot weld production efficiency
which is barely above 60%, examine your product liability consequences, and ask
your self can you provide the type of process control training that will meet
your unique weld quality requirements?
If you have a moment try this process
control flux cored weld test.
Management
Environmental Consequences
from Pipe Welds to Ship Yards.
Management
Environmental Consequences
of Ship weld failure.
03/2007:
During the next decade, we can anticipate record ship production and the oceans
shipping lanes will have a lot in common with an Atlanta traffic jam. Unless dramatic
improvements are made in the global manual flux cored and MIG weld quality, we
can anticipate extensive environmental disasters and loss of life.
An
Ed Craig - Tom O'Malley,
Flux Cored Work Shop.
"Flux
Core Best Weld Practices and Weld Process
Controls for all Plate and Pipe
Vee Groove Welds"
 .jpg)
click
here for info
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Ed
has assisted ship yards in the USA and Canada. He has worked with Norwegian, Swedish,
Danish, German, Polish Italian. English, Korean, Japanese, Yanks and Canadians
and and don't forget those tenacious thick skinned, highly intelligent, canny
Scottish weld personnel. His experiences with these hard working, great welding
characters indicated they all played around with the weld controls and had never
received the proper flux cored weld process control training especially when dealing
with ceramic backed welds and the flux cored process. From this experience Ed
developed thicker skin, an increased sense of humor and also developed the following
Flux Cored Process Control Training Work Shop and unique Process Control Training
Resources. These programs are applicable to all position, open root pipe and plate
vee groove welds with ceramic backing.
For those that cannot
attend the work shop visit Ed's MIG and Flux Core Weld Process Control Training
resources
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WHEN
YOU HAVE UNIQUE WELD MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS LIKE A SHIP YARD, YOU NEED TO EVALUATE
THE VARIABLES THAT IMPACT WELD QUALITY AND THEN PROVIDE THE UNIQUE WELD SOLUTIONS.
THIS LOGIC CAN BE APPLIED TO ANY INDUSTRY THAT USES FLUX CORED OR MIG ON CRITICAL
APPLICATIONS:
Is the ship yard weld management
aware of the uniqueness of it's ceramic backed weld applications, and aware that
when those sub contractor welders walk into their yards most will have never seen
a ceramic?
Is the ship yard management aware that the majority of their
weld work force including many supervisors and engineers don't understand the
flux cored process and that's why they play around with the controls? (you don't
want to give this flux cored weld process test to your employees).
Is the ship yard management aware that a stick welder with 20 years experience
typically only brings incorrect techniques and bad weld practices to the flux
cored process. Difficult, ceramic backed vee groove applications require more
than weld procedures, the weld instructions provided to the work force must deal
with variables that daily impact both weld quality / productivity
[]
How many weld shops have you seen in which the combined vee grooves in the thick
steels can be < 40 degrees?
[] How
many times have you seen critical weld joints with variable weld gaps
from
3 to 25 mm?
[] How many times have you seen
welders welding on wet / cold parts and steels coated with primers, paint, rust
and other surface contaminates?
The ship yard welder is offered these
unique challenges daily by supervisors who frequently know little about the flux
cored process. (Similar to the supervisors in the Big Three and
Tier 1 plants that cannot set a MIG weld). To make the job a little more
complex, the ship yard welders may then have to make these challenging welds in
20 mph winds, 50 feet up on a scaffold, at minus 20 degrees.
A
FEW SHIP YARD WELD VARIABLES:
[] narrow, inconsistent deep vee groove
welds, 
[]
variable and excess root gaps,
[] unique weld requirements for ceramic backed
roots,
[] poor erratic weld edge preparations,
[] welding on primer, paint,
rust and oxides,
[] hostile daily changing environment,
[] difficult welding
access and positions for all position welds,
[] welders and engineers who play
around with weld controls,
[] ship yard fitters who have never been educated
on the cost consequences the quality liability potential or difficulties of welding
their poor weld joints,
[] supervisors, managers and engineers making flux
cored and MIG process welding decisions, when the reality is their weld knowledge
never got past a E6010 or E7018 stick electrode.
At
any large facility in which extensive welding is carried out, you will find the
weld procedures established at that facility or location
rarely compensate for the variables that influence
the daily weld quality and productivity.
HYDROGEN
CRACKS: What about those ships being built with the higher strength and
low alloy steels?
My gut instinct tells me that if a ship yard cannot
control the weld issues that occur with low carbon steels, that ship yard will
not provide any better controls on the higher strength or low ally steels.
In
the good old days when welders deposited a leisurely three pound of stick electrode
a shift, they would keep the E7018 electrodes in portable heated containers. Today
when they should be depositing over 20 pounds of flux cored weld wire a shift,
( few do) who knows how long that flux cored wire has sat on the wire feeder.
WHAT IT TAKES TO GET THOSE HYDROGEN CRACKS STARTED:
[]
The high strength, and low alloy steels are there.
[] The large root gaps,
the plate misalignment, plate and weld stresses are there.
[] The lack of
control on surface contaminates is there.
[] The lack of control on preheat
and interpass temp controls will be there.
[] The lack of history on the flux
cored weld consumables will there as the weld wire soaks up the moisture in the
damp and humid ship building climates.
THAT
9 mm DIFFERENCE IN THE ROOT GAPS, MEANT 70 PERCENT MORE WELD, 70 PERCENT MORE
CONSUMABLES AND 70 PERCENT MORE OPPORTUNITY FOR WELD REWORK, NOT SOMETHING THE
FITTERS WILL HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT.
Its
inevitable that on some 200 million dollar merchant vessel, or on that one billion
dollar naval vessel,
containing high strength or low alloy steels, that many ships will leave the docks
with hydrogen cracks. To add misery to misery, the cracks will typically be in
the weld's heat affected zones, along side welds that are
bound to contain lack of fusion, slag inclusions and extensive porosity.
The
navy may go on missions looking for those elusive terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction, however if I was a sailor I would be more nervous about the next
great ocean wave that hits the ship.
Title
: INVESTIGATION OF FRACTURED STEEL PLATES REMOVED FROM WELDING SHIPS.
Corporate
Author : PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV UNIVERSITY PARK
Personal
Author(s) : Williams, M. L. ; Meyerson, M. R. ; Kluge, G. L. ; Dale, L. R.
Report
Date : 01 JUN 1951
Pagination
or Media Count : 102
Abstract
: Samples of fractured plates from 72 ships were examined, and various laboratory
examinations and tests were made on 113 plates selected from these samples. Information
regarding the structural failures involved was obtained from the cooperating agencies,
and the failures were analyzed on the basis of this information combined with
the results of the laboratory investigations. The failures usually occurred at
low temperatures, and the origin of the fractures could be traced, invariably,
to a point of stress concentration at a geometrical or metallurgical notch resulting
from design details or welding defects.
Note
from Ed: Fifty six years have passed, they screwed the SMAW welds in the 1950's
and they still cannot make a ship with sound flux cored welds fifty years later.
When are ship yards going to get control of the welding processes?
U.S.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL TRANSMITS REPORT SUBSTANTIATING WHISTLEBLOWER'S ALLEGATIONS
OF EXTENSIVE
DEFECTIVE WELDS ON U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS' LAUNCH
AND RECOVERY SYSTEMS
FOR IMMEDIATE
RELEASE - 3/13/03
CONTACT: JANE MCFARLAND
(202) 653-7984
The
U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) today transmitted to President Bush and the
Congress, an investigative report substantiating a whistleblower's allegations
that unqualified welders, at the Naval Air Depot in North
Island, California, had improperly performed "critical" welds on the
catapult hydraulic piping systems of four U.S. aircraft carriers.
These
hydraulic systems are used to power various control devices and motors related
to aircraft carriers' launch and recovery systems. Nonconforming welds were found
on the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Constellation, currently stationed in the
Persian Gulf; the USS Nimitz, currently headed to the Gulf; and the USS John C.
Stennis. Weld failures, although unlikely, could have resulted in the loss of
aircraft and in injuries during launch procedures. The investigation also found
that the jet blast deflector cylinder vent piping onboard a fifth aircraft carrier,
the USS Carl Vinson, had also been improperly welded.
The whistleblower, Kristin Shott,
a welder with over twelve years of experience, alleged to OSC that North Island
Depot Voyage Repair Team (VRT) welders were not qualified for the work that they
performed. Compounding the problem, she alleged that the Depot's inspectors, tasked
with inspecting the welders' work, were also unqualified. Special Counsel Elaine
Kaplan concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that the information
Ms. Shott had provided disclosed a substantial and specific danger to public safety,
as well as violations of military welding standards. By law, when such a substantial
likelihood determination is made with respect to a whistleblower's disclosures,
the agency involved, in this case the Department of the Navy, is required to conduct
an investigation of the disclosures and report its findings and any planned corrective
and/or disciplinary actions to the Special Counsel.
The
Special Counsel transmitted Ms. Shott's disclosures to former Secretary of the
Navy, The Honorable Gordon R. England. The Office of the Naval Inspector General
(OIG) investigated the allegations for the Secretary. In reporting back to OSC,
former Navy Secretary England concluded the investigation "exposed serious
shortcomings in the quality assurance program at the Naval Air Depot." Specifically,
the investigation found that the North Island VRT welders performed critical shipboard
welding processes on Navy ships that they were not qualified to perform, the weld
inspectors who performed the "nondestructive testing" inspections of
the welds were not properly certified, and the VRT lacked a viable quality assurance
program. The former Navy Secretary noted that "Carrier Battle Ships are our
frontline of national defense" and that "the events described in the
report of investigation establish how easy it would be to render these assets
ineffective."
In
February 2002, upon learning of the preliminary results of the investigation,
senior management at the North Island Navy Air Depot immediately suspended all
shipboard welding operations and testing inspections at the base, pending the
training and qualification of welders and inspectors. Shortly thereafter, North
Island Depot welders and inspectors were sent to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
(PSNS) for Naval Sea System Command qualification and recertification training.
In addition, teams from PSNS inspected welds performed by VRT welders in order
to discover and repair critical nonconforming welds. On
the USS Abraham Lincoln, the PSNS team found that only 2 out of approximately
100 welds passed their inspection; on the USS Nimitz, only one weld out of approximately
100 passed. The team also found the VRT welders had performed nonconforming
welds on the USS Constellation and USS John C. Stennis' catapult hydraulic systems
and on the USS Carl Vinson's the jet blast deflector cylinder vent piping. The
agency report explains that most of the nonconforming welds failed inspection
because they were undersized. Repairs to the catapult hydraulic piping
systems on the USS Lincoln were completed in April 2002; on the USS Nimitz, in
May 2002; on the USS Constellation, in June 2002; and on the USS Stennis, in November
2002. Repairs on the jet blast deflector cylinder vent piping onboard the USS
Vinson were completed in December 2002. The agency reports that
$468,000 was spent on weld repairs for three of the aircraft carriers. The report
did not include the repair costs for two of the carriers - the USS Stennis and
USS Vinson.
To
ensure that future compliance with Naval Air Sea System Command quality and certification
requirements is permanently sustained, the agency report states that the Naval
Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (Carderock), intends
to conduct an initial welding and testing audit of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
organizations, to be followed by an audit every two years thereafter. The
agency informed OSC that Carderock intends to conduct welding and testing audits
at three East Coast Naval Stations during the final week of March. However, audits
have not yet been scheduled for NAVAIR's West Coast locations, including the North
Island Depot, nor has funding been received at this point by Carderock to allow
these audits to take place.
The agency report concluded that four supervisors and one Naval Officer had performed
their duties in a negligent manner. It found that the North Island VRT first-line
supervisor was aware that the VRT employees were not properly certified, yet he
failed to aggressively pursue this issue through his chain of command and continued
to assign VRT welders work that he knew they were unqualified to perform. As a
result, he was suspended for three days. A Non-Punitive Letter of Caution was
issued to the Naval Officer who oversaw the quality assurance program. Two civilian
VRT supervisors and one civilian quality assurance supervisor were counseled and
orally admonished.
ED'S NOTE. TYPICAL GOVERNMENT / MILITARY REACTION. BLAME
LOW LEVEL OFFICERS AND SUPERVISORS. WHERE WERE THE SHIP YARD MANAGERS, ENGINEERS
AND SENIOR OFFICERS WHEN THE SHIPS WERE BEING BUILT? PERHAPS THEY WERE TOO BUSY
PATTING EACH OTHER ON THE BACK OR TEEING UP ON THE NINTH HOLE AT THE LOCAL GOLF
COURSE?
THE
NEXT REPORT IS RELATED.
In
transmitting the agency report to the President and the Congress, the Special
Counsel is required by statute to evaluate whether it contains the necessary information
and whether its findings appear reasonable. Special Counsel Elaine Kaplan found
that, in most respects, the Department of the Navy report met these requirements.
However, she found that the disciplinary action taken against responsible officials
did not appear adequate in light of the gravity of their misconduct, and she expressed
concern that the agency has not yet scheduled welding and NDT inspection audits
for West Coast NAVAIR locations, noting that these audits are critical to the
extent that they may allow the Navy to discover and repair other noncompliant
welds on Navy vessels, that may otherwise pose a danger to public safety.
THE
SUPERSTRUCTURE ON FFG 7 CLASS SHIPS HAS EXPERIENCED EXTENSIVE
CRACKING. THE CAUSE OF THE CRACKING HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE A COMBINATION
OF HIGH DESIGN STRESS COUPLED WITH POOR QUALITY WELDING.
IS
THE HIGH COST OF U.S. NAVAL SHIPBUILDING FINALLY CATCHING UP WITH THE NAVY LEADERSHIP?
Tim Colton, September 3, 2004.
The
authoritative Washington newsletter "Inside the Navy" reports that the
Navy's budget request for FY06 will include only four new ships that will still
cost $6 billion. The four ships are: one SSN at a budget-busting $2.5 billion;
one DD(X) at a mind-boggling $1.5 billion; one LPD at a ludicrous $1.0 billion;
and one T-AKE at a relatively modest $0.4 billion.
The
high costs are no real surprise. Naval shipbuilding costs
have been out of control for about 15 years now and the Navy has brought
it on itself. First, it essentially eliminated competition by forcing more than
half the shipbuilding industrial base, including critical suppliers, out of business.
Then it created a contracting environment in which the few
remaining shipbuilders not only have no incentive to reduce costs but are actively
encouraged to increase costs. Finally, it has driven per-ship costs up
even further by specifying ever more complex ship designs: there is no bell or
whistle that the Navy doesn't want to have at least three of on every one of its
new ships. There are other factors at play here but these are the most significant
ones. The net result is that we now have a big-ship shipbuilding industry that
is the most expensive and the most incompetently managed in the world and we have
now, not coincidentally, almost completely lost our ability to build deep-draft
merchant ships.
I
have to keep reinforcing this broad allegation with a fundamental fact: in the
1970s, productivity in U.S. big-ship shipbuilding was measured to be about half
that in Japanese shipbuilding; today it is around a quarter. (So much for the
National Shipbuilding Research Program.)
I
also have to keep pointing out that the problem isn't with U.S. shipyard workers:
our successful small yards demonstrate that. The problem also isn't with U.S.
shipyard facilities: they are all just as good as the older European and Japanese
yards. The problem in the yards is with U.S. shipyard management.
There's way too much of it and it doesn't seem to have a clue what it's doing.
But
the real problem is the U.S. Navy itself. The Navy dug this hole and can't find
its way out. It talks about "acquisition reform" but what it means by
this is spreading the appropriation of funds for individual ships over multiple
years. This would not, of course, have any impact whatever on the high cost of
ships: it would merely obfuscate the accounting of that high cost. We do, indeed,
need acquisition reform: we need rigorous cost-benefit analysis of every new ship
system; we need elimination of all but the most critical change orders; we need
firm-fixed-price contracts, with incentives for cost reduction and schedule acceleration
and penalties for cost over-runs and delays; we need to reintroduce competition
by requiring prime contractors to competitively procure x% of each contract from
the second-tier shipbuilders; we need detailed audits of indirect costs and non-allowance
of about half of them. And much more besides.
IF A SHIP YARD WAS RUN LIKE A SHIP:
It's
unfortunate that the trend in weld manufacturing in
ship yards during the last two decades has been "hands off management and
engineers who do not own the processes vital to the products they build. Engineers
who use the title "weld engineer" without the ability to control a simple
two control weld process.
I hade a good laugh in 2005 when I read about
ship yard managers looking at laser welding for ship yards, facilities that typically
have for decades struggled to implement or control the simple to use MIG or flux
cored process. Ship yards that often have one inch (25mm) gaps in the weld joints. Ship
yard management would do well to compare themselves with the way efficient ships
or submarines are run. A captain or engineer on these vessels typically can operate
or take apart anything on a ship. I am not suggesting that this radical, technical
expertise should be part of any manufacturing managers job description. I
am suggesting that today we need a compromise in which managers and engineers
show more interest in the equipment responsible for building their ships, and
when it comes to welding perhaps instead of providing unqualified opinions on
MIG and flux cored they could read a book on the subject, and examine the requirements
for Best Weld Practices and Weld Process Controls.
To get manufacturing management and engineers back
into the equipment process ownership loop, an important first step would be for
these individuals to show the workers that when they open their mouths, they can
provide welders something most don't have"weld process control knowledge".
Looking for excellent MIG and flux cored weld process knowlege?
a
good start would be this book.
Looking
for the most effective Flux cored weld process control training program ever developed
for a ship yard and all flux cored welds, click
here.
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CANADA
BUYS A BRITISH SUB LEMON
WITH POOR LIMEY
WELDS.
Canada
has complained about four second-hand submarines bought from Britain which it
says are in need of extensive repairs.
The Canadians are likely to demand compensation from the British
Ministry of Defence. The four diesel subs were fully operational before they were
sold.
One of the vessels, the submarine Victoria, is currently in dry
dock in Halifax. The MoD had said it was fully seaworthy and fit to dive but the
Victoria leaked hydraulic fluid during its voyage home. That vessel also had a
dented hull and the Canadians dived to full depth unaware of the risk. The dent
was discovered later during a check up.
There is also 
an
investigation under way into the possibility of a crack in a valve on top of the
submarines. The potential problem came to light after the Royal Navy found such
a crack on a submarine sitting in Britain waiting to be delivered. Exhaust valves
on all four subs must now be taken apart. The repair bill is already approaching
C$1m (approximately £500,000) and BBC correspondent Tom Carver says Canada
will probably demand compensation.
Britain no longer uses diesel subs.
In a statement, the MoD said the four diesel subs were fully operational before
they were sold. The problems have caused embarrassment for the UK, which had mothballed
the four vessels before the Canadians bought them for about £332m (C$750m).
Leak alert
The
list of submarine problems include;
· A dent in the Victoria that will cost up to half a million.
·
Bad high-pressure welds in three of the four subs.
· A bad fuel tank
in one sub.
· One sub was leaking (I'd image that is bad news in any
naval vessel and doubly so in a submarine)
· Cracked valves in the
diesel generator that would cause flooding if they failed.
____________________________________________
THANK
GOD FOR CANADIAN HOCKY STICKS "A"
HMCS Windsor was carrying out a training exercise off the coast of Nova Scotia
when a hydraulic system failed, causing a leak. The submarine was returning toshore
when the submarine sprung a second, more serious leak after a crew member turned
a switch the wrong way. About 2,000 litres of water flooded into the compartments.
When the Windsor first made its way to Canada last year, CBC television filmed
the journey. But during the trip the submarine leaked hydraulic fluid,
the radar mast leaked and had to be fixed with masking tape and a rubbish bag,
the sonar broke and another faulty piece of equipment had to be unjammed with
a hockey stick. The poor welds on Canadian submarines
will be a good match for the poor welds on Canada's frigates see next story.
________________________________________
Her
Majesty's Tireless Threatens Mediterranean
By John LaForge and Bonnie Urfer
"The
most important thing we could do is…outlaw nuclear weapons to start with,
then we outlaw nuclear reactors too. … I'm not proud of the part I played…
I think we'll probably destroy ourselves." "-From Jan. 28, 1982 statement
to U.S. Senate by Adm. Hyman Rickover, "father" of the U.S. nuclear
navy."
GIBRALTAR-The
near reactor meltdown aboard Britain's submarine Tireless, its spill of radioactive
cooling water into the Mediterranean, and a risky, experimental and possibly illegal
repair operation in a densely populated area, have brought thousands of outraged
Gibraltar and Spanish residents into the streets. Since May 19, the 280-foot Tireless
with its failed reactor has been docked near the center of Gibraltar, population
29,165.
According to the British Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Tireless'
reactor failed May 12 while patrolling between Sicily and North Africa. One or
more welds in the sub's primary cooling system cracked and began leaking hot,
pressurized and radioactively contaminated water into the sea. Authorities initially
claimed there was no danger of a radiation spill, but later admitted the leakage.
Neither the Navy nor the MOD has said how much of the deadly wastewater was spewed.
Two
major papers, the Sunday Times and the Guardian, have reported that Tireless came
within "a few minutes" of a reactor meltdown when the high-pressure
coolant began rushing out of the system. One Navy spokesperson said, "Once
the fault had ripped through, it could not be isolated from the rest of the system."
The Navy asserts that the reactor was properly shut down, but while Tireless was
towed into the Bay of Algeciras the leak continued until, "Shortly after
arriving [May 19] in Gibraltar the leak was temporarily sealed" (according
to a Nov. 23 report by the hastily-assembled government Nuclear Safety Advisory
Panel). Captain Dis Carneay quickly announced that Tireless would return to Britain
for repairs. But on June 26 the MOD announced that repairs would take place at
Gibraltar. No explanation was given for the change, except to say (in Nov.) that
moving the sub "would introduce new, higher risks to the submarine, its crew
and, possibly, to coastal communities." The decision to repair Tireless in
Gibraltar violates Royal Navy procedure. The "Z" berths at Gibraltar
are only for "recreational" stops. "These berths are not cleared
for the maintenance or repair of the nuclear plant," according to Navy regulations.
Gibraltar's berths have no permanent health physics department, no radiation monitoring
organization and no disaster evacuation plans-all of which are required for the
"X" berths built in Britain specifically for "refit, repair or
maintenance of nuclear-powered warships.
Seven months later, the Tireless' worn out, leaking reactor still rests 1,800
meters from the desalination plant for Gibraltar's water supply. The Scottish
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has protested that the geography of Gibraltar
makes evacuation in the event of a radiation disaster difficult: the only land
exit to the north could easily be within the contaminated area.
Risky,
experimental repair
The Tireless uses a U.S.-designed pressurized water reactor
built by Rolls Royce. In the reactor, primary cooling water flows directly over
the extremely hot reactor fuel and then is pumped to a generator where it heats
secondary water to create steam. Because the primary coolant circulates inside
the reactor, it makes direct contact with intensely hot uranium fuel cladding,
becoming radioactive.
When
fuel cladding is damaged, cooling water is further contaminated with extremely
deadly fission products, including plutonium-241, iodine-129, cesium-137, strontium-90,
cobalt-60 and nickel-59 among others. If the Tireless' fuel cladding were damaged,
some of these long-lived poisons would have poured into the sea for over a week.
(Iodine-129 is dangerous for 150 million years; nickel-59 for 75,000.) Based on
assurances by the MOD, the Advisory Panel claims that the cladding remains intact.
It
took until the end of June for Tireless' reactor to cool down enough for inspection.
The "2-mm wide crack" in a weld
is said to be near the reactor vessel; the length of the crack was not divulged.
The Navy has decided to completely remove a section of the heavy
pipe and send it to England for study.
Still, the machinists didn't start
the cutting and removal of the cracked ducting until Nov. 24. If the job was undertaken
as announced, the three-day operation involved extremely dangerous and novel experiments:
1)
Primary coolant was to be drained from the system for up to three weeks, leaving
the reactor fuel at risk of overheating. The deliberately increased risk of a
reactor meltdown was found by the Advisory Panel "to be acceptably low."
(The Navy even convinced the panel that the fuel system is able to survive a complete
loss of coolant.)
2)
Some 24 cubic meters (6,340 gallons) of this primary cooling water was to be transferred
to shore. And because Gibraltar's Z berth is not equipped with rad waste storage
facilities, a containment system was cobbled together ad hoc. (The system will
itself become contaminated waste.) The radioactive wastewater has already been
on Gibraltar longer than the MOD's risk assessment suggested.
3)
The section of failed welds was to be removed with a rig designed, built and tested
for the first time. To replace the cracked pipe, the Navy intends to employ a
welding method never used on nuclear reactors, a system that even the Advisory
Panel found worrisome. "The Panel recognizes that having a direct path from
the reactor to the outside environment places total reliance on the continued
integrity of the fuel cladding to contain the fission products."
4)
Finally, pressure testing of the primary loop, and restart of the reactor involve
additional risks of leaks and fuel overheating.
Fleet
withdrawal finds half the subs at risk
In late October, the British Navy
recalled all of the Tireless' sister ships for reactor inspections. Defense Minister
John Spellar admitted in the House of Commons that the reactor flaws on the Tireless
might be "generic." A partial review of 12 Trafalgar and Swiftsure Class
subs found six at risk of the same cooling system cracking. Five subs were cleared
of the flaw, including HMS Triumph. Triumph, however, was on patrol and couldn't
have undergone a thorough safety check since that requires a reactor shutdown.
Protests on the rise
Twelve
thousand people marched Nov. 25 from La Linea in Spain (population 59,879), toward
the submarine berth-only three kilometers away. The demonstrators demanded the
removal and repair elsewhere of the crippled reactor. Some 1,500 marchers and
boaters protested Aug. 15 near the Tireless' mooring, which is less than one mile
from Gibraltar's major tourist attractions. Sept. 15, as most of the world's attention
was focused on the sunken Russian sub Kursk, thousands filled the Plaza de la
Constitucion in La Linea to declare the "Platform Against the Nuclear Submarine."
Thousands protested July 13, declaring "Gibraltar isn't Europe's junkyard!"
Seven kilometers across the bay in the city of Algeciras-population 102,058-mayor
Patricio Gonzalez has collected petitions intended for the courts in Gibraltar
condemning the MOD's repair scheme and demanding an explanation of why the sub
can't be towed back to Britain. The protesters have howled at the government's
emergency "preparedness" plan to dispense potassium iodate tablets after
a radiation disaster.
The Progressive Foundation
-- Nukewatch
P.O. Box 649
Luck, WI 54853
Phone: (715) 472-4185
Fax:
(715) 472-4184.
Email: info@nukewatch.com
Website: www.nukewatch.com
Weld
Process Control Comes From
Weld Process Knowledge
DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY
YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
History
of USS Thresher (SSN-593)
Related Resources:
Note: This is not a picture of the Threasher.
(SSN-593:
displacement 3,700 (surfaced), 4,300 (submerged); length 278'6"; beam 31'8";
speed 20+ knots; complement 100; armament 4 torpedo tubes; cl. Thresher)
In
company with Skylark (ASR-20), Thresher put to sea on 10 April 1963 for deep-diving
exercises. In addition to her 16 officers and 96 enlisted men, the submarine carried
17 civilian technicians to observe her performance during the deep-diving tests.
Fifteen
minutes after reaching her assigned test depth, the submarine communicated with
Skylark by underwater telephone, apprizing the submarine rescue ship of difficulties.
Garbled transmissions indicated that--far below the surface--things were going
wrong. Suddenly, listeners in Skylark heard a noise "like air rushing into
an air tank"--then, silence.
Efforts
to reestablish contact with Thresher failed, and a search group was formed in
an attempt to locate the submarine. Rescue ship Recovery (ASR-43) subsequently
recovered bits of debris, including gloves and bits of internal insulation. Photographs
taken by bathyscaph Trieste proved that the submarine had broken up, taking all
hands on board to their deaths in 5,500 of water, some 220 miles east of Boston.
Thresher was officially declared lost in April 1963.
Subsequently,
a Court of Inquiry was convened and, after studying pictures and other data, opined
that the loss of Thresher was in all probability due to a casting, piping, or
welding failure that flooded the engine room with water. This water probably caused
electrical failures that automatically shutdown the nuclear reactor, causing an
initial power loss and the eventual loss of the boat.
Thresher
is in six major sections on the ocean floor, with the majority in a single debris
field about 400 yards square. The major sections are the sail, sonar dome, bow
section, engineering spaces, operations spaces, and the tail section.
Owing
to the pressurized-water nuclear reactor in the engine room, deep ocean radiological
monitoring operations were conducted in August 1983 and August 1986. The site
had been previously monitored in 1965 and 1977 and none of the samples obtained
showed any evidence of release of radioactivity from the reactor fuel elements.
Fission products were not detected above concentrations typical of worldwide background
levels in sediment, water, or marine life samples.
Engineer
and Cold Water Sinks TITANIC
Iceberg Gets Bum Rap in TITANIC Sinking
Ericka
8 ships built.
8 ships with structural problems.
From
Marine Log Home Page:
RINA
says "small structural failure or leak"
likely caused Erika sinking
Italian
classification society RINA, Genoa, says its initial findings on the causes of
the sinking of the Maltese-flag tanker Erika during a major storm in December
point to a small structural failure or leak low down in the hull structure. This
was followed by cracking that eventually led to the collapse of the hull.
RINA
says its investigations prove that the calculated residual strength of the vessel
at the time of the casualty should have been sufficient
to withstand normal operation of the vessel in the prevailing weather.
The residual strength was within IACS limits.
Initial
investigations show that the hull structure initially failed at some point low
in the hull, and that complete failure occurred only after cracks had propagated
from that source.
RINA
is continue its investigations to determine the cause of that initial failure
and the results of the subsequent actions of the master, owners and other parties
involved. RINA will focus on several potential causes of the initial failure,
including:
[]
possible poor loading or poor shiphandling by the master;
[] poor workmanship
during repairs, perhaps at the Adriatic yard in Bijela, Montenegro, during August
1998;
[] failure of welding due to poor design or workmanship
during building,
[] the possibility that Erika struck a floating object.
RINA has appointed Three Quays Marine Service and Studio Tecnico Navale Ansaldo
to conduct further independent investigations covering: design and construction
of the Erika and its seven sister ships. "Eight sister ships of the Erika
class were built, under two different class societies, and have been classed by
five different IACS classification societies at some time in their lives. All
of these ships have suffered structural problems. Three of them, other than the
Erika, were serious. No information on this history of problems was available
to RINA," he says.
Side
Note: It appears that in the case of the Prestige and the Erika tankers that the
structural failures occurred a few months after welding
repairs were carried out on the hulls. This would suggest that welding
could be a factor in the structural failures.
Welding
LPG tankers
Welding
LPG tankers the ESAB way:
By Ben Altemühl, editor of Svetsaren, interviewing
Stocznia Gdynia production management
ESAB
is supplying the Polish, Gdynia ship yard with a complete consumables package
for welding gas tanks in
NV 2-4 low-temperature steel.
Note: Condensed by Ed for this section:
The
history of the Gdynia shipyard, founded in 1922, is associated in many ways with
the 20th century misery and uprising of the Polish nation as a whole. The ship
yard was establsihed in the roaring twenties with ship repairs and was as hard
hit as Poland itself by the Great Depression that was soon to follow, smothering
any attempt to transform itself into a fully-fledged new building yard. It would
take a series of bankruptcies and re-starts under new ownership before, at the
end of the thirties, the first Gdynia-designed ships slid off the slipway.
Stocznia
Gdynia is now one of the largest and most profitable European yards, exporting
close to 100% of its products to clients from all over the world. It is capable
of building ships up to 400,000 dwt and consumes around 150,000 tonnes of steel
a year. It builds fishing trawlers, general cargo and multi-purpose container
vessels, crude and chemical tankers, OBO carriers, car carriers and large passenger
ferries. The yard is ISO 9001 certified and has access to modern design and analysis
tools such as CAD/CAM, NAPA, Tribon and Foran systems.
LPG
carriers
At the time of our visit, the construction of the first of two 50,000
tonne deadweight DNV class 1A1 LPG tankers was nearing completion. These ships
have four tank sections with a total capacity of 78,500 m3, each of which consists
of two independent prismatic tanks (see Figure 1). The tanks have a double hull
and are surrounded by a safety barrier. The tanks are designed for a service
temperature of -50ºC at an overpressure of 0.275 bar. The CVN requirement
for the steel and the welds is 27J at -55ºC.
Plates
according to NV 2-4 specification are purchased from the Polish steel manufacturer
Huta Czestochowa in three thickness categories; 12, 20 and
28 mm.
The
carriers are constructed in sections according to modern shipbuilding practice
involving panel fabrication, the construction of sub-sections, the assembly of
grand sections and the final connection of grand sections in the dock. Plates
coloured red represent DNV NV2-4 steel and the green ones indicate standard shipbuilding
steel. The hull sections are welded together in the dock to form the hull
of the ship. The tanks are completed at the yard before being lowered into the
hull. After this, the prefabricated top side including the deck is attached, together
with the processing installations (Figure 2).
The
welding of DNV NV 2-4 low-temperature steel
Although
steels according to DNV class NV2-4 are developed for low-temperature service,
they contain only a small amount of alloying elements and have a relatively low
carbon equivalent. In the thickness range used by the Gdynia Yard (12, 20 and
28 mm) to construct the tanks, no preheating is required.
However, to avoid the loss of HAZ impact toughness, there
are limitations to the heat input and the interpass temperature.
From
the point of view of the weld metal, extra care is required to avoid the loss
of low-temperature impact toughness. The consumables used by the Gdynia Yard for
welding DNV NV 2-4 steel fall into two categories; basic
for SAW and MMA and rutile Ti-B micro-alloyed for FCAW.
Basic
consumables produce a low-oxygen ferritic weld metal, consisting mainly of large
amounts of somewhat soft grain boundary ferrite and acicular ferrite. The low-temperature
toughness depends on the quality of the soft grain boundary ferrite in the microstructure
and is further improved by 2.5% Ni-alloying. The
microstructure and toughness can be spoilt in two ways. When
the heat input is too low, bainite or martensite may appear as a result
of the overly rapid cooling of the weld. When it is too
high, the ferrite becomes coarse.
For
rutile, Ti-B micro-alloyed flux-cored wires, low-temperature toughness is based
on the presence of large amounts of fine acicular ferrite. In line with basic
consumables, the micro-structure is spoilt when bainite or martensite is introduced
when the heat input is too low. With high heat inputs, however,
grain boundary ferrite appears at the expense of acicular ferrite, with an even
more detrimental effect on the toughness.
When
it comes to the welding of DNV NV 2-4, this means that the heat input has to be
within a certain range to be assured of the correct weld microstructure. ESAB
recommends a heat input range of 1 to 2.5kJ/mm for the consumables described under
the next heading “welding consumables”. The welding techniques that
are used to build up the joint differ from normal shipbuilding practice and are
more in the direction of welding for offshore fabrication. Although preheating
is not required for DNV NV 2-4 (as with many offshore steel grades), the interpass
temperature must be limited. Full weaving, a very common shipbuilding technique,
should be avoided as much as possible because it can take the heat input beyond
critical levels. The split-weave or stringer bead technique, both offshore fabrication
methods, may be less productive, but it ensures the correct weld microstructure
with corresponding good low-temperature impact values.
ESAB
has been involved in many LPG projects as a supplier of welding consumables and
equipment. In many cases, the company has provided the welder with training and
assistance in setting up suitable welding procedures. It has often proved necessary
to instruct welders in the right techniques to obtain the desired low-temperature
weld metal impact toughness. Special support was given to Gdynia to get it started
with the cored-wire welding of the LPG tanks of the carriers currently under construction.
There
is not a single global ship builder who has provided Best
Weld Practices for their yards. Take a moment and evaluate the wide variety
of unnecessary weld consumables in your yards. And don't forget to examine the
excessive annual MIG weld 
equipment
replacement and maintenance cost associated with the wide array of unnecessary
electronically sensitive MIG equipment utilized. 
Welding
Consumables
MMA
is applied to a limited extent only, mainly for fit-up work in the construction
of the sub- and grand sections of the LPG tanks. Figure 5 shows MMA welding with
OK 73.68, a very versatile consumable for this kind of work.